Contradiction or not Contradiction. Hegel's Dialectic between Brandom and Priest by Bordignon, Michela
 Verifiche XLI (1-3), 2012, pp. 221-245. 
CONTRADICTION OR NON-CONTRADICTION? 
HEGEL’S DIALECTIC BETWEEN BRANDOM AND PRIEST 
 
by Michela Bordignon 
 
 
Abstract. The aim of the paper is to analyse Brandom’s account of Hegel’s 
conception of determinate negation and the role this structure plays in the 
dialectical process with respect to the problem of contradiction. After having 
shown both the merits and the limits of Brandom’s account, I will refer to 
Priest’s dialetheistic approach to contradiction as an alternative contemporary 
perspective from which it is possible to capture essential features of Hegel’s 
notion of contradiction, and I will test the equation of Hegel’s dialectic with 
Priest dialetheism. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to Horstmann, «Hegel thinks of his new logic as 
being in part incompatible with traditional logic»1. The strongest 
expression of this new conception of logic is the first thesis of the 
work Hegel wrote in 1801 in order to earn his teaching 
habilitation: «contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi»2. Hegel 
seems to claim that contradictions are true. 
The Hegelian thesis of the truth of contradiction is highly 
problematic. This is shown by Popper’s critique based on the 
principle of ex falso quodlibet: «if a theory contains a contradiction, 
then it entails everything, and therefore, indeed, nothing […]. A 
theory which involves a contradiction is therefore entirely useless 
 

 I thank Graham Wetherall for kindly correcting a previous English translation 
of  this paper and for his suggestions and helpful remarks. Of  course, all 
remaining errors are mine. 
1 R.-P. HORSTMANN, What is Hegel’s Legacy, and What Should We Do With It?, 
«European Journal of Philosophy», VII (2), 1999, p. 280. 
2 G.W.F. HEGEL, Dissertationi Philosophicae de Orbitis Planetarum, in Gesammelte 
Werke, Meiner, Hamburg 1968 ss. (from now on GW), Bd. V, Schriften und 
Entwürfen (1799-1808), hrsg. von M. Baum e K. R. Meist, Meiner, Hamburg 
1998, p. 227. 
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as a theory»3. In a logical system containing true contradictions, 
everything is true as well as false. This system cannot say anything 
scientifically relevant4.  
Nevertheless, this is not the only way to look at Hegel’s 
philosophical picture. Robert Brandom, in Tales of the Mighty Dead, 
claims: «far from rejecting the law of noncontradiction […] Hegel 
radicalizes it, and places it at the very center of his thought»5. In 
this paper I will try to explain the meaning of this claim and to 
clarify the extent to which it proves to be a good account of the 
role contradiction plays in Hegelian dialectic. I will not provide a 
detailed critical analysis of all aspects of Brandom’s semantic 
interpretation of dialectic. I will simplify Brandom’s account, in 
order to focus on the way Brandom explains the structure of 
determinate negation and on the role this structure plays in the 
dialectical process with respect to the problem of contradiction. 
After having shown both the merits and the limits of Brandom’s 
account, I will refer to Priest’s dialetheistic approach to 
contradiction as an alternative contemporary perspective from 
which it is possible to capture essential features of Hegel’s notion 
of contradiction, and I will test the equation of Hegel’s dialectic 
with Priest dialetheism. 
 
 
2. Brandom’s account of determinate negation and contradiction 
 
Brandom clarifies the three sides of dialectic as follows: 
a) First, the side of abstraction or of the understanding. In 
this first conceptual step «one grasps the property as im-
 
3 K. POPPER, Conjectures and Refutation, Routledge, London and New York 2002, 
p. 429.   
4 Horstmann writes: «Wenn Hegel also Widerspruche für notwendig und 
demnach unvermeidbar hält und insofern die Gültigkeit des Satzes vom 
Widerspruch bestreitet, dann liefert er seine eigene Theorie offensichtlich der 
Irrationalität und Unwissenschaftlichkeit aus» (R.-P. HORSTMANN, Schwierigkeiten 
und Voraussetzungen der dialektischen Philosophie Hegels, in Seminar: Dialektik in der 
Philosophie Hegels, ed. by R.-P. Horstmann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, p. 19). 
5 R. BRANDOM, Tales of  the Mighty Dead, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
2002, p. 179. 
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mediately contentful. It is just the thing it is, brutally there»6. 
This immediate conception of a determination corresponds to 
its atomistic conception. The conceptual content of the deter-
mination in question is self-subsistent, determined in itself. It is 
not necessary to consider its relations to other determinations 
in order to understand it. 
b) Secondly, the dialectical or negatively rational side. In this 
second conceptual step «one sees that a property is determinate 
only insofar as it strongly differs from other properties, 
excluding them in the sense that it is impossible for one object 
(at one time) to have two properties that are incompatible in 
this sense»7. In this way, the relational structure of a 
determination is made explicit. The determination itself is 
considered in terms of «relations to, mediation by, difference 
and disparity from other properties»8. The negative character of 
this moment consists in the fact that it shows the inconsistence 
of the first immediate articulation of the determination in 
question. Nevertheless, this second step is not a sufficient 
condition in order to individuate the concrete nature of the 
determination. The determination itself risks being dissolved in 
an infinite system of relations with what is other than itself.  
c) Thirdly, the conceptual content of the determination gets 
consistently individuated only in the third side of dialectic, 
namely the speculative or positively rational one. This last step 
starts with the pure immediacy of the first moment overcome 
in the pure mediation of the second one. These two opposite 
characterizations are brought together and the conceptual 
content of the determination is grasped as an immediacy which 
is fully mediated. The identity of the determination with itself 
consists of its relation with what is other than itself: «In the 
final stage, then, one returns to the determinate content of the 
property, but now understands its identity as essentially 
consisting in its relation of exclusion or of difference from 
 
6 Ivi, p. 204. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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those it contrasts with»9. Something determinate is not simply 
this determinate thing, and it is not identifiable even as the 
negative exclusion of the determinate things which are other 
than and incompatible with itself. It rather is this determinate 
thing insofar as it is the negative exclusion of the determinate 
things which is other than and incompatible with itself.   
In order to explain Brandom’s claim regarding the 
radicalization of the law of non-contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic, 
I will try to clarify the nature of the negative-exclusive relations 
through which determinations get concretely structured. The 
negative character of these relations is nothing other than what 
Hegel defines as determinate negation. Therefore, the way 
Brandom explains determinate negation will be essential in under-
standing his account of contradiction in the dialectical process. 
I start with a fundamental distinction made by Brandom 
between two kinds of difference.  
(a) compatible difference;  
(b) incompatible difference.  
The first kind of difference is the difference between two 
properties that are different and compatible, like square and red. 
Brandom calls this kind of relation «mere difference»10. The 
second kind of difference is the difference between properties 
that are different and incompatible, like square and triangular. 
This difference is called «material incompatibility»11 and it is the 
one involved in Brandom’s account of determinate negation12. He 
 
9 Ivi, p. 205. 
10 Ivi, p. 179. 
11 Ibid. 
12 «To say that a concept stands in material incompatibility relations with other 
concepts is to say that some inferential moves from or to that concept are 
possible and others are not. A concept is, thus, the result of this process of 
determination, a process that by defining relations of incompatibility with 
other concepts generates an inferential context and, hence, a logical space. By 
inferential context, I understand the group of concepts against which a 
particular concept stand in concrete, material, inferential relations, and through 
the mediation of which a concept becomes a concrete universal. By logical space, I 
understand the system of interrelated concepts that is thus generated» (D. 
PERINETTI, History, Concepts and Normativity in Hegel, in Hegel’s Theory of the 
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describes this difference in this way: «properties can also be 
different in the stronger sense of material incompatibility – of the 
impossibility of one and the same thing simultaneously exhibiting 
both»13. The negation meant as material incompatibility does not 
deal with the formal relation between terms and propositions, but 
rather with the relation pertaining to the content of the terms and 
the propositions in question14. This very relation is constitutive 
precisely with respect to the way this content is articulated and 
thus the negation it embodies can be said to be a «determinate 
negation». 
In this sense, according to Brandom’s reading of determinate 
negation, material incompatibility is at the basis of every kind of 
determinateness. Everything is determinate because it is 
characterized by some properties that exclude other incompatible 
properties. This means that everything is what it is because it is 
constituted in one way and not in another incompatible way15. 
 
Subject, ed. by D.G. Carlson, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills-New York 2005, 
p. 63). 
13 R. BRANDOM, Tales of  the Mighty Dead, p. 179. 
14 In his analysis of  negation (which is not specifically related to Hegel’s 
conception of  determinate negation), Francesco Berto ascribes the relation of  
material incompatibility not only to properties, but also to concepts, states of  
affairs, propositions, worlds: «I shall talk of  material exclusion or, equivalently, 
of  material incompatibility. It may be explained in terms of  concepts, 
properties, states of  affairs, propositions, or worlds, depending on one’s 
metaphysical preferences—and we want to be as neutral as possible not only 
on logical, but also on metaphysical issues. For instance, we may view it as the 
relation that holds between a couple of  properties P1 and P2 if  and only if, by 
having P1, an object has dismissed any chance of  simultaneously having P2. 
Or we may also claim that material incompatibility holds between two 
concepts C1 and C2, if  and only if  the very instantiating C1 by a puts a bar on 
the possibility that a also instantiates C2. Or we may say that it holds between 
two states of  affairs s1 and s2, if  and only if  the holding of  s1 (in world w, at 
time t) precludes the possibility that s2 also holds (in world w, at time t). Put it 
any way you like, material exclusion has to do with content, not mere 
performance: it is rooted in our experience of  the world, rather than in 
pragmatics» (F. BERTO, Άδύνατον and Material Exclusion, «Australasian Journal of  
Philosophy», LXXXVI (2), 2008, p. 179-180). 
15 «The essence of  determinateness is modally robust exclusion» (R. 
BRANDOM, Tales of  the Mighty Dead, p. 179). 
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This exclusive difference is what is expressed by the principle 
omnis determinatio est negatio and it is the essence of Hegelian 
conception of negation as determinate negation: «For Hegel, it is 
this exclusiveness that is the essence of negation»16. 
Determinate negation, namely the negative-exclusive rela-
tions through which everything gets determined, is inherently 
connected with the role played by contradiction in Hegel’s 
dialectic. Moreover, the exclusiveness at the basis of the 
determining power of negation is nothing other than the way the 
law of non-contradiction gets embodied in the way things actually 
are: «for an essential, defining property of negation is the 
exclusiveness codified in the law of non-contradiction: p rules out 
not-p; they are incompatible»17. This is the same as to say that 
something cannot be both p and not-p at the same time and in 
the same respect.  
Therefore, according to Brandom, Hegel rejects the law of 
non-contradiction only insofar as it is only the minimal and more 
abstract expression of incompatibility, and then it provides only 
the minimal and more abstract expression of what deter-
minateness actually is. This obviously depends on the fact that 
the law of non-contradiction is a formal principle, and insofar as 
it is formal, it cannot grasp the material character of exclusiveness 
at the basis of determinateness. Nevertheless, this does not imply 
a denial of the law of non-contradiction. The law of non-
contradiction proves to be at the very basis of material 
exclusiveness and determinateness. We could say that even if the 
law of non-contradiction is not a sufficient condition of concrete 
determinateness, it is a necessary condition of determinateness 
itself. 
In Brandom’s view, Hegelian dialectic is perfectly consistent. 
In this way Brandom’s reading aims at an actualization of the 
Hegelian system: by getting rid of inconsistence he makes 
Hegelian system more «palatable» for the contemporary 
philosophical sensibility.  
 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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3. The merits and the limits of Brandom’s account 
 
I want to raise just one simple question: does Brandom’s 
interpretation provide a good account of determinate negation in 
Hegel’s dialectic and of the role contradiction plays within it? 
First of all, negation is normally defined as a truth-functional 
operator which applies to a sentence to produce a sentence which 
is true if the original sentence is false, false if it is true. Obviously, 
Brandom is right in avoiding employing the concept of truth and 
falsity in order to explain what determinate negation consists in. 
Determinate negation is not a formal operator. Rather, it 
corresponds to some kind of negative relation affecting the 
content of thought determinations. The adjective «material» that 
Brandom ascribes to the relation of incompatibility is precisely 
meant to capture the non-formalistic character of Hegel’s notion 
of negation. 
Secondly, the negative relation at the basis of determinate 
negation cannot be one of mere diversity. Determinate negation 
has a constitutive value as regards to the way thought deter-
minations are structured and this value is rooted in the 
incompatibility between opposed determinations: something is 
what it is because it excludes from itself everything incompatible 
with itself. Mere diversity does not embody this exclusive 
character and therefore it cannot have the determining value that 
Hegel ascribes to determinate negation. Given a determination d 
affecting an object O, the mere diversity of d with another 
determination f that does not affect O and that does not have any 
kind of relation with d cannot say anything about d itself and the 
way it determines O. They are completely independent and their 
relation is simply external. In order to have a determining value, 
the negation needs to be a difference between mutually exclusive 
properties. This kind of difference is inherent in the properties 
themselves and it is thus constitutive with respect to the way they 
are18. 
 
18 A conception of negation that is not based on the concept of truth and 
falsity, but refers to some kind of incompatibility relation between opposed 
determinations, cannot be reduced to a metaphorical notion of negation. 
 Michela Bordignon  Articles 
 
228 
Nevertheless, something more is needed in order to explain 
how determinate negation works in dialectic. We can find the 
missing element in Hegel’s words. In the Science of Logic Hegel 
claims: 
 
Determinateness is negation (Die Bestimmtheit ist Negation) – is the 
absolute principle of Spinoza’s philosophy; this true and simple 
insight establishes the absolute unity of substance. But Spinoza 
stops short at negation as determinateness or quality (bey der Negation 
als Bestimmtheit oder Qualität); he does not advance to a cognition 
of negation as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation (absoluter, d. h. 
sich negirender Negation)19. 
 
In these lines Hegel is trying to explain the nature of 
determinate negation, and, more specifically, the way negation is 
determinateness, namely the dynamic through which everything 
constitutes itself. Hegel refers to Spinoza’s principle, as Brandom 
 
Rather, the reference to the notion of material incompatibility allows us to 
explain what negation is at a pre-discursive level, that is to say not as regards to 
the way negation works in our thought and discourse about how things are, 
but as regards to how things are in themselves. Such an approach to the notion 
of negation does not deal only with Hegel’s conception of determinate 
negation, but also with a more general treatment of what negation is. This kind 
of analysis is not a way to avoid talking about truth values and the way 
negation works in our language, but rather it aims at pointing out a primary 
structure of negation on which also the linguistic dimension of negation is 
based. Such a treatment of negation is not specifically Hegelian. We can find a 
similar approach to the structure of negation also in the contemporary debate 
on negation. For instance, according to Sainsbury, «the apprehension of 
incompatibility [is] an ability more primitive than the use of negation. The 
negation operator is being explained as initially a means of registering (publicly 
or privately) a perceived incompatibility […] For present purposes, what 
matters is that incompatibility be a very basic feature of a speaker’s (or proto-
speaker’s) experience of the world, so that negation can plausibly be explained 
in terms of incompatibility» (R.M. SAINSBURY, Can Rational Dialetheism be 
Refuted by Considerations about Negation and Denial?, «Protosociology», 10, 1997, p. 
224). 
19 G.W.F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, erster Band, Die objektive Logik, zweites 
Buch, Die Lehre vom Wesen (1813), in GW, Bd. XI, hrsg. von F. Hogemann, W. 
Jaeschke, Meiner, Hamburg 1978 (from now on WdL II), p. 376; engl. transl. by 
A.V. Miller, Science of Logic, Allen – Unwin, London 1969, pp. 387-571, p. 536. 
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does; but Hegel does something more than Brandom: Hegel says 
that negation as it is meant in Spinoza’s principle is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for something to determine itself. 
According to Hegel, the essential character for a negation to be 
really determinate negation is self-reference20. A negation is really 
determinate negation insofar as it is absolute negation, negation 
of negation, namely «self-negating negation»21. 
Therefore, determinate negation is a negative relation 
through which a determination excludes not its other, but itself. 
Thanks to this self-exclusion, determinations turn into what is 
other than themselves (selbstbezüglicher Andersheit). This self-
exclusive relation is what Hegel calls ‘absolute negativity’ (absolute 
 
20 «Die Selbstbeziehung und die Differenz der Unvereinbarkeit sind also 
gleichermaßen formelle Eigenschaften des Gedankens der absolute Negativität, 
der aus der Negationsform der Andersheit gebildet worden ist» (D. HENRICH, 
Die Logik der Reflexion. Neue Fassung, in Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der 
Reflexion, ed. by D. Henrich, «Hegel-Studien», Beiheft 18, Bouvier, Bonn 1978, 
p. 265). 
21 Koch underlines the self-referential dynamic characterizing Hegel’s 
conception of negation: «Die zweite Besonderheit der Hegelsche Negation hat 
damit zu tun, dass sie in Selbstanwendung auftreten kann» (A.F. KOCH, Dasein 
und Fürsichsein (Hegels Logik der Qualität), in G.W.F. Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik, 
ed. by A.F. Koch - F. Schick, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2002, p. 29). Henrich 
relates this self-referential character of negation with its being a double 
negation: a negation which denies itself turns out to be a double negation. 
Nevertheless, this double negation does not work like the double negation of 
standard logic – the first negation pertains to a proposition and the second one 
pertains to the first and annuls its negative character. i.e. the two negations are 
different and work at two different levels. In Hegel’s notion of negation, the 
negating negation and the negated negation is one and the same, because the 
negation in question is a negation which denies itself:  «Für Hegel 
autonomisierte Negation gilt aber, dass sie gerade deshalb verdoppelt werden 
muss, weil sie auf diese Weise selbstreferentiell gemacht warden kann. Daraus 
folgt aber, da di beiden Negationen nicht dadurch voneinander verscheiden 
sind. Die Negation, welche die Negation negiert, negiert sich. Dem ist aber 
sogleich hinzuzufügen, dass die Negation sich nur dann negieren wird, von 
sich, sofern sie sich negiert, unterschieden kann. In der autonomen Negation 
ist die Negation selbst-negierend und durch sich negiert» (D. HENRICH, Hegels 
Grundoperation. Eine Einleitung in die Wissenschaft der Logik, in Der Idealismus und 
seine Gegenwart, ed. by U. Guzzoni – B. Rang – L. Siep, Meiner, Hamburg 1976, 
p. 216). 
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Negativität), which is the key principle at the basis of the dialectical 
movement of logical determinations22.  
Therefore, it is possible to distinguish two kinds of 
negations, that Hegel himself clearly separates in the passage I 
quoted. Both involve incompatibility, or, better said, exclus-
iveness. Nevertheless, they have a different structure and 
completely different implications with respect to the role played 
by contradiction in the dialectical process: 
1) on the one hand, there is Spinoza’s determinate negation. 
This negation seems to correspond to Brandom’s account 
of determinate negation as material incompatibility; 
2) on the other hand, there is negation as absolute negation, 
or self-relating negation.  
Brandom, as well as Spinoza, «stops short at negation as 
determinateness or quality»23. Nevertheless, this determinateness or 
quality is not the concrete and true determinateness Brandom 
pretends to grasp through his conception of material incompa-
tibility, but simply an abstract determinateness. More specifically, 
the determinateness based on Spinoza’s and Brandom’s con-
ception of determinate negation basically cor-responds to the 
 
22 «Der Gedanke von selbstbezüglicher Andersheit kann das Prinzip definieren, 
das Hegel ‘absolute Negativität’ nennt» (D. HENRICH, Die Logik der Reflexion, p. 
263). In order to make explicit the self-referential character of negation, 
Henrich refers to the platonic notion of Heterótes and to a negation conceived 
not as a simple not-being, but as a determinate not-being. This kind of 
negation deals with the idea of a determinate other. Nevertheless, Hegel 
develops this platonic input in a new way. In effect, the negativity Plato refers 
to corresponds to a relation of exclusion between two different terms. The 
peculiar character of Hegel’s notion of negativity consists in turning the 
exclusion between two different relata into the self-exclusion of one and the 
same term: «Die Situation verwandelt sich erst dann grundlegend, wenn das 
Prädikat ‘anders’  so angewendet wird, dass dabei nicht zugleich auf einen 
weiteren Fall Bezug genommen werden soll, von dem ein vorliegender 
unterschieden ist. […] Wird auf ‘Andersheit’ das Prädikat ‘anders’ angewendet, 
aber so, dass auf nichts weiter als eben auf Andersheit Bezug genommen 
werden kann, so wird die zweistellige Relation insofern als einstellige Relation 
und zugleich Selbstbeziehung gebraucht» (ivi, pp. 262-263). 
23 WdL II, p. 376; p. 536. 
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abstract conception of determinateness at the beginning of the 
Doctrine of Being, and precisely in determinate being (Dasein)24.  
It is no accident that in the Anmerkung of the section Quality 
Hegel refers precisely to Spinoza’s principle «omnis determinatio est 
negatio». More importantly, the characterization of determinate-
ness in the section ‘quality’ corresponds exactly to the way 
Brandom explains determinateness as constituted by material 
incompatibility. Determinate being is «being with a non-being 
(Seyn mit einem nichtseyn) […] they do not extend beyond each 
other; so far as determinate being is in the form of being, so far it 
is non-being, so far is it determinate (gehen sie nicht übereinander 
hinaus; so weit das Daseyn seyend ist, so weit ist es Nichtseyn, ist es 
bestimmt)»25. Everything is a determinate being, that is, everything 
has a quality insofar as it is not its non-being, namely what is 
incompatible with it. Nevertheless, the determinateness in 
question is just the more abstract articulation of determinateness 
 
24 Henrich underlines the fact that the self-referential negation is the most 
important logical tool in Hegel’s logic: «Diese strikten Selbstbezug von 
Negation im Sinne eines Anderes seiner selbst hat Hegel zum wichtigsten 
Operationsmittel seiner Logik gemacht» (D. HENRICH, Formen der Negation in 
Hegels Logik, in Seminar: Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, ed. by R.-P. 
Horstmann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1978, p. 220). Nevertheless, he also 
says that it is not the only one. There are parts of  the dialectical process that 
do not involve this self-referential negative dynamic: «In Hegels Logik findet 
sich aber auch noch eine andere Form der Negation. […] In diesen Begriffen 
ist ein relationaler Sachverhalt gedacht, in dem zunächst einmal eine Bezieung 
von Einem zu einem Andere vorausgesetzt ist, die nicht vom Typ der 
˃Andersheit in sich˂, sondern die einfache Bezieung verschiedener Relata ist» 
(ivi, p. 223). 
25 G.W.F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, erster Band, Die objektive Logik, erstes 
Buch, Die Lehre vom Seyn (1832), in GW, Bd. XXI, hrsg. von F. Hogemann, W. 
Jaeschke, Meiner, Hamburg 1985 (from now on WdL I), pp. 97-98; engl. transl. 
by A.V. Miller, Science of  Logic, Allen – Unwin, London 1969, pp. 23-385, pp. 
110-1. Moreover, it is no accident that interpreters who assume Brandom’s 
conception of  determinate negation and try to test it on the Science of  Logic 
usually refer to Hegel’s thematization of  Dasein: «Dasein is a bestimmtes Sein, a 
determinate being, something of  which you can say: “Det (x)” only insofar as x 
does not have some properties. Something is something determinate because it 
is a centre of  exclusion of  properties» (F. BERTO, Che cos’è la dialettica hegeliana?, 
(my transl.) Il Poligrafo, Padova 2005, p. 285).  
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itself. It is «the one-sidedness of quality as a determinateness 
which is only immediate or only in the form of being (die Einseitigkeit 
der Qualität als nur unmittelbarer oder seyender Bestimmheit)»26. The 
concrete nature of determinate being as such is developed only at 
the end of the chapter on determinate being, namely in infinity, 
where infinity proves to be structured according to a determinate 
negation that, far from being other-exclusive, is completely self-
exclusive. 
An other-exclusive negation, namely a determinate negation 
meant as material incompatibility, would imply an abstract and 
one-sided conception of infinity, what Hegel defines as ‘spurious 
infinity’. The spurious infinity is an infinity that is simply identical 
with itself insofar as is it different from the finite, which is 
incompatible with it. Hegel himself shows how this conception of 
infinity is in itself contradictory, because infinity is limited by the 
finite it excludes, and thus it is something finite: 
 
The infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation 
wherein they are qualitatively distinct others, is to be called the 
spurious infinite, the infinite of the understanding, for which it has 
the value of the highest, the absolute Truth. The understanding 
[…] is entangled in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contra-
diction. […] This contradiction occurs as a direct result of the 
circumstance that the finite remains as a determinate being 
opposed to the infinite, so that there are two determinatenesses; 
there are two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in their 
relationship the infinite is only the limit of the finite and is thus 
only a determinate infinite, an infinite which is itself finite27.  
 
Understanding, in keeping the finite and the infinite as two 
separate determinations, turns out to explain the infinite as 
something determinate and finite, that is to say as something 
 
26 WdL I, p. 98; p. 111. Moreover, it has to be noted that already in 
determinate being the self-relating structure of negation is implicitly present. 
Houlgate correctly remarks that «something […] is real being, but real being 
that is self-relating. It is also negation, but again negation that is self-relating. 
Self-relating negation, however, is necessarily “self-negating” negation because 
it is negation that is not mere negation after all» (S. HOULGATE, The Opening of 
Hegel’s Logic, Purdue University Press, West Lafayette 2006, p. 317). 
27 WdL I, p. 127; pp. 139-140. 
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different from what infinite is. Being determinate, being finite, 
contradicts the very nature of infinity itself. This contradiction is 
the symptom of the abstractness and one-sidedness of the 
understanding’s point of view, which is not able to grasp the 
concrete and true nature of infinity. This negative-critical 
meaning of contradiction partly corresponds to the role Brandom 
ascribes to this logical structure. Yet, the contradiction involved 
by the dialectic of infinity also has a positive side. This 
contradiction is also the symptom of the necessity for the 
concrete self-determination of infinity to include in itself its own 
opposite, i.e. the finite. 
The true nature of infinity, that includes the finite in itself, is 
articulated as a negativity that, far from being other-exclusive and 
letting the finite out of itself, is self-exclusive. Infinity «is 
essentially negation of the negation, the self-related negation (sie 
ist ferner wesentlich Negation der Negation, die sich auf sich beziehende 
Negation ist)»28. The negation in question is a self-negation because 
infinity does not deny the finite as something beyond itself. 
Infinity is the self-negating process inherent in the finite itself.  
The finite is itself insofar as it ends and is no more itself. Its 
ending is its own self-negation, and this self-negation is the 
constituting dynamic of infinity: «as regards the finite, it is readily 
conceded that it is the null; but its very nullity is the infinity from 
which it is thus inseparable»29. Infinity is the self-superseding of 
the finite, because it is the finite’s passing over into what is other 
than itself and the realization of its finitude in this very process of 
passing over that is its own self-negation. In this sense, infinity is 
both itself and its other – the finite – because it is the self-
 
28 WdL I, p. 137; p. 150. Spieker underlines precisely the self-referential 
dynamic of  the negation lying at the basis of  the structure of  infinity: «Die 
Unendlichkeit ist weder Nicht-Anderes noch (einfaches) Anderes, sondern 
Sichselbstandersheit […] Das Anderssein, als welches sich das Sein zeigte, 
muss anders sein als etwas (Negation von etwas), es ist aber nichts vorhanden 
als es selbst. Das Anderssein ist also Negation, die auf  sich bezogen, sich 
anders ist (Negation der Negation)» (M. SPIEKER, Wahres Leben denken, Hegel-
Studien, Beiheft 51, Meiner, Hamburg 2009, p. 116) 
29 WdL I, p. 131; p. 143. 
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negating dynamic through which the finite itself concretely 
realizes its finitude: 
 
Finitude is only as a transcending of itself (Hinausgehen über sich); 
it therefore contains infinity, the other of itself. Similarly, 
infinity is only as a transcending of the finite (Hinausgehen über 
das Endliche); it therefore essentially contains its other and is, 
consequently, in its own self the other of itself. The finite is not 
sublated (aufgehoben) by the infinite as by a power existing 
outside of it; on the contrary, its infinity consists in sublating 
(aufzuheben) its own self30. 
 
Therefore, infinity is inherently self-contradictory, and this 
self-contradiction is grounded in the self-referential character of 
the negation through which it gets determined. The finite is itself 
insofar as it denies itself and passes over into its other; it is itself 
insofar as it is no more itself. Infinity is itself in this very process 
of self-negation, because it is this process through which the 
finite ceases to be what it is and passes over into its other, 
realizing itself as true infinity: «that in which the finite sublates 
itself is the infinite as the negating of finitude»31. Yet, the finitude 
that infinity negates does not lie outside of itself, but is its 
constitutive moment. Hence, its negating of finitude is a negation 
 
30 Ivi, p. 133; pp. 145-6. This is why «each contains its own other in its own 
determination, just as much as each, taken on its own account, considered  in its own 
self, has its other present within it as its own moment» (WdL I, p. 132; p. 144). 
31 Ivi, p. 133; p. 146. The contradiction in question is a kind of  ontological 
contradiction. The notion of  ontological contradiction is not just an Hegelian 
extravagance and it is not even completely extraneous to the contemporary 
debate on the notion of  contradiction. In fact, there are different ways of  
conceiving of  this notion. There is a semantic, syntactic, pragmatic definition 
of  the notion of  contradiction and, most importantly for our concern, there is 
also an ontological definition of  contradiction in the context of  philosophy of  
language. More specifically, an ontological contradiction consists in some kind 
of  incompatibility involved in the way something is, or, better said, «a 
contradictory situation is one where both B and ~B (it is not the case that B) 
hold for some B» (R. ROUTLEY, V. ROUTLEY, Negation and Contradiction, «Revista 
Colombiana de Matemàticas», 19, 1985, p. 204). 
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of itself, or, a self-negation. This is why infinity both is and is not 
the finite, and so is inherently contradictory32. 
Self-reference is an essential character of determinate nega-
tion, not only with respect to the structure of the finite and 
infinity, but with respect to the concrete articulation of all the 
determinations: 
 
Now the negativity (Negativität) just considered constitutes the 
turning point of the movement of the Notion (den Wendungspunkt 
der Bewegung des Begriffes). It is the simple point of the negative relation 
to self (Sie ist der einfache Punkt der negative Beziehung auf sich), 
the innermost source of all activity, of all animate and spiritual 
self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true pos-
sesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity 
alone rests the sublating of the opposition between Notion and 
reality, and the unity that is truth33. 
 
Every determination gets structured in this negative self-
reference and this self-negation is what pushes it to overcome its 
immediacy and to develop its concrete determinateness. This 
negativity is the absolute negativity, the dialectical soul that leads 
every determination to overcome the distance between its reality 
and its concept, that is the distance between what it immediately 
is and its concrete truth. This negative self-reference is what 
brings every determination to realize its concrete nature34. 
 
32 «A finite something is self-negating being; and immediately infinite being is 
the immediately self-relating being that finite, self-negating being constitutes 
but that is immediately different from such self-negation. In true infinity, self-
relating being becomes explicitly identical with self-negating, finite being. In true 
infinity, therefore, the positivity and negativity at the heart of being are 
perfectly fused» (S. HOULGATE, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic, p. 428). 
33 G.W.F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, zweiter Band, Die subjektive Logik. Die 
Lehre vom Begriff (1816), in GW, Bd. XII, hrsg. von F. Hogemann e W. 
Jaeschke, Meiner, Hamburg 1981, p. 246; engl. transl. by A.V. Miller, Science of 
Logic, Allen – Unwin, London 1969, pp. 573-844, p. 835; «Inherent in the 
concept is a negativity or dialectic which moves it from one form to another. 
Negation is not the negation of a predicate; it is not discursive negation but a 
more general principle obtaining in all reality» (A. FERRARIN, Hegel and Aristotle, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 69). 
34 «Hegel considers every possible content of  speculative science – whether a 
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Brandom misses the self-referential character of determinate 
negation35. This gap prevents him from understanding the true 
role of contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic. Brandom’s determinate 
negation is other-exclusive; Hegel’s determinate negation is self-
exclusive. The other-exclusiveness of Brandom’s conception of 
the determining power of negation is precisely what grounds the 
radicalization of the law of non-contradiction he sees in Hegelian 
dialectic. Something is what it is because it is characterized by some 
properties and not by other properties incompatible with them. 
If the presupposition of the other-exclusiveness of deter-
minate negation in Hegel’s dialectic is misleading – as I have 
shown – then the conception of contradiction it involves is 
misleading too. Far from being a radicalization of the law of non-
contradiction, Hegelian dialectic radically casts doubt on the 
universal and necessary validity of this principle, by showing the 
contradictory concrete articulation of the determinations, i.e. a 
contradictory articulation raised by the self-referential character 
of the negation constitutive of the determinations themselves. 
The contradiction of the finite and infinity, as well as the 
contradictory structure of other logical determinations, can be 
said to be the truth of these determinations. It is their truth 
because it is a self-contradictory logical dynamic immanent in the 
development of the determinations, that is a logical dynamic 
 
concept, a living being, or a mode of  thought – as driven by the urge to 
resolve the tension between that which it is in itself  and its actual 
determination» (K. DE BOER, The Sway of  the Negative, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke - New York 2010, p. 44). 
35 Actually, there is a way in which some interpreters endorsing Brandom’s 
account try to explain the self-referential character of  determinate negation. 
Basically, they claim that it consists in nothing but the fact that the exclusive 
relation between opposite determinations is a relation that is part of  the 
necessary conditions for defining the determinations themselves. In this sense, 
it is a relation of  exclusion that is internal in the determinations. For example, 
Cortella claims: «qualities imply the exclusion of  other qualities, and then imply 
the introduction of  the negation toward itself. […] The negation affecting the 
quality is not only a negation toward what is other than the quality – external 
negation – but it is also an internal negation, i.e. a negation toward the 
possibility to be other qualities» (L. CORTELLA, Autocritica del moderno, my 
transl., Il Poligrafo, Padova 2002, p. 234). 
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following which the determinations come to concretely realize 
what they really are. Therefore, this structure is the necessary 
concrete and intrinsic development of their own articulation and 
this comes to light only by focusing on the self-relating character 
of the negativity at their basis. Only performing this self-negating 
and self-contradictory dynamic are these determinations what 
they really are. 
Nonetheless, even if Brandom’s conception of material 
incompatibility and the coherentist interpretation of dialectic it 
involves cannot be considered a good account of Hegel’s 
thought, we could ask if it at least supports an actualizing aim 
with respect to Hegelian philosophy.  
The answer is no, and indeed for one simple reason. An 
actualizing project of Hegel’s philosophy cannot disregard 
Hegel’s most fundamental convictions, one of which is under-
lined by Horstmann’s claim I quoted at the beginning of this 
paper, namely that «Hegel thinks of his new logic as being in part 
incompatible with traditional logic»36. One of the most important 
incompatibilities between standard logic and Hegel’s speculative 
logic concerns the approach to contradiction, namely the fact that 
contradictio est regula veri, i.e. contradiction is the law of truth. 
If we select some parts of Hegel’s philosophy and get rid of 
the thesis of the truth of contradiction, like Brandom does, we 
are not looking at Hegel anymore, because we are just simply 
looking somewhere else. On such a kind of approach Horstmann 
writes: «if we start to separate elements of this philosophy from 
their systematic context in order to profit from them philo-
sophically in isolation we don’t execute Hegel’s will any longer 
but we subscribe to a different project»37. 
 
 
4. Hegel’s dialectic and Priest’s dialetheism 
 
I think there are contemporary perspectives from which it is 
possible to come back to Hegel’s legacy, and in particular to 
 
36 R.-P. HORSTMANN, What is Hegel’s Legacy, and What Should We Do With It?, p. 
280. 
37 Ivi, p. 285. 
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Hegel’s thesis of the truth of contradiction. Paraconsistent logical 
systems, and especially dialetheism, are examples of this possibility. 
The research on paraconsistent logical systems started in the 
Fifties. It was born as an effort to clarify the status of dialectical 
logic and to face the problem of logical systems containing true 
contradictions. Paraconsistent systems reject the ex falso quodlibet. 
Dialetheism is the view that there are true contradictions38. 
Graham Priest is the most important advocate of the dialetheist 
thesis, and even if his work cannot be considered an in-
terpretation of Hegel’s notion of contradiction, it refers to 
Hegel’s thought as one of the most important antecedents of 
dialetheism in the history of philosophy. In the manifesto of 
dialetheism, that is In Contradiction, namely the book Priest 
published in 1987, he is quite explicit about this: «It is the main 
claim of this book that Hegel was right: our concepts, or some of 
them anyway, are inconsistent»39.  In this sense, Priest’s claim can 
highlight the revolutionary character of Hegelian conception of 
contradiction with respect to standard logic paradigm. 
I believe the comparison with dialetheism to be crucial in 
order to highlight two decisive aspects of the notion of 
contradiction in Hegel’s thought – two aspects that an inter-
pretation like Brandom’s totally misses, namely (1) the ontological 
value of contradiction and (2) the self-referential character of the 
negativity at its basis.  
(1) Priest refers to examples of  ontological contradiction that 
are explicitly Hegelian. To show this, we need only to recall 
the structure of  limit or the structure of  movement. Here I 
will refer only to the former. 
In Hegel’s analysis of  the determination of  the limit 
in the Doctrine of  Being, the limit is defined both as the 
locus within which a thing, A, begins to be what it is, that is 
to say its generative principle (in this sense limit is A) and as 
the locus within which a thing, A, ends, namely the locus 
 
38 Dialetheism is «the view that the LNC fails, that some contradictions are 
true» (G. PRIEST, What is so Bad about Contradiction?, «The Journal of  Philo-
sophy», XCV (8), 1998, p. 416). 
39 G. PRIEST, In Contradiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, p. 4. 
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where its non-being begins (in this sense limit is ¬A). The 
structure of  the limit of  A is self-contradictory insofar as 
the limit of  A is both A and ¬A. The limit is determined 
in two incompatible ways40. 
Actually, in What is so bad about Contradiction? Priest 
analyzes an example of  ontological contradiction that 
specifically mirrors Hegel’s thematization of  the deter-
mination of  the limit: 
 
I walk out of the room; for an instant, I am symmetrically 
poised, one foot in, one foot out, my centre of gravity lying on 
the vertical plane containing the centre of gravity of the door. 
Am I in or not in the room? By symmetry, I am neither in rather 
than not in, nor not in rather than in. The pure light of reason 
therefore countenances only two answers to the question: I am 
both in and not in, or neither in nor not in. […] If I am neither 
in nor not in, then I am not (in) and not (not in). By the law of 
double negation, I am both in and not in41. 
 
Priest characterizes the ontological structure of  the limit of  
the room by saying where I am when I am exactly in this 
limit. The results is the same of  Hegel’s Logic: when I am 
in this limit I am both in the room and not in the room42. 
 
40 Considering this two ways separately does not allow us to define the essence 
of  the limit. Saying that A, in being limited, is just A, or that it is just ¬A, is 
only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for defining the limit. On the 
one hand, there are infinite points in A that are A without being the limit of  
A. On the other hand, there are infinite points in what is other than A that are 
¬A without being the limit of  A. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
defining the limit is to keep together A and ¬A, and allow that ‘the limit is A 
and the limit is ¬A’. Hegel claims: «Limit is the mediation through which 
something and other each as well is, as is not» (WdL I, p. 114; p. 127). As 
Illetterati remarks, the limit «is the point where both what is determinate and 
what is negated in the determination both receive their being and cease to be 
what they are» (L. ILLETTERATI, Figure del limite. Esperienze e forme della finitezza, 
my transl., Verifiche, Trento 1996, p. 40). 
41 G. PRIEST, What is so Bad about Contradiction?, p. 415. 
42 Another paradigmatic example Priest refers to is the instant of  change, 
which is again and not accidentally explicitly Hegelian. Cf. G. PRIEST, In 
Contradiction, pp. 159-181. 
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(2) Priest argues for the thesis of  the truth of  contradiction on 
the epistemological level through the analysis of  a logical-
semantic phenomenon that involves a self-referential 
negative dynamic, namely the self-reference paradoxes43. 
Priest tries «to defend the view that the semantic paradoxes 
are bona fide sound arguments»44. Therefore, the con-
tradictions entailed by them are true contradictions.  
Self-reference paradoxes and the way they imply 
contradictions have something in common with the way 
logical determinations in Hegel’s logic turns out to be 
contradictorily structured. Here I will refer only to the liar 
paradox and I will try to show how the self-reference 
structure working at the basis of  the paradox can shed light 
on how contradictions arise in Hegel’s logic45. 
The liar paradox is a proposition negatively referred 
to itself, saying of  itself  that it is false. The result is a 
proposition that is true insofar as it is false, and that is false 
insofar as it is true: 
 
 V (p) ↔ F (p) 
 
If  the falsity of  p is equal to the negation of  p, then this 
formula can be translated in the simpler form: 
  
p ↔ ¬p 
 
43 «The paradoxes are all arguments starting with apparently analytic principles 
concerning truth, membership, etc., and proceeding via apparently valid 
reasoning to a conclusion of the form ‘a and not-a’» (ivi, p. 11). 
44 Ivi, p. 10. 
45 Even Koch refers to the linguistic phenomenon of  the liar paradox (and 
more generally, to the self-reference paradoxes) in order to show that self-
reference negation is not only an Hegelian extravagance, because it is a logical 
dynamic that has a crucial role also in the contemporary philosophy of  
language: «die Lügnerantinomie bzw. Jeder Satz, der seiner Negation logisch 
äquivalent ist, gibt uns einen unabhängigen Grung, Hegels Grundoperation, 
die Autonomisierung der Negation, al seine Operation anzuerkennen, die wir 
vortheoretisch immer schon vollzogen haben» (A.F. KOCH, Die Selbstbeziung der 
Negation in Hegels Logik, «Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung», LIII (1), 
1999, pp. 8-9). 
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that means: it is the case of  p iff  it is not the case of  p. The 
conclusion of  the liar paradox is a self-contradiction, based 
on some sort of  self-negation.  
A structural analogy with Hegel’s dialectic can be 
outlined on the basis of  this self-negating dynamic. If  we 
go back to the example of  the finite this is quite clear. On 
the one hand, the finite is itself  insofar as it ends and it is 
no more itself. On the other hand, the finite, by stopping 
being itself, realizes its very nature, that is to say in its 
coming to an end and not being itself  anymore it is 
properly itself  because it realizes its own finitude: «The 
finite in its ceasing-to-be, in this negation of  itself  has 
attained its being-in-itself, in united with itself»46. 
This self-negation is not the simple overcoming of  
the finite. Quite to the contrary, its coming to an end and 
its not being itself  anymore is the very moment in which it 
is really what it is. In negating itself  and passing over into 
its other the finite realizes its own finitude; and the 
concrete realization of  the finite necessarily implies its own 
self-negation. In the very moment in which the finite F 
denies itself  and turns into ¬F, it concretely realizes itself  
as F, and the concrete realization of  F takes place only 
insofar as it turns out to be ¬F. Hence, the logical dynamic 
of  the finite mirrors the form of  the liar paradox: if  the 
finite (F) is itself, then it is not itself  (¬F); if  the finite is 
not itself  (¬F) than it is itself  (F): 
 
F ↔ ¬F 
 
Both F and ¬F hold for F. The nature of the finite is 
inherently self-contradictory and the self-contradiction of the 
finite is based on the self-referential negative dynamic I have tried 
to outline47. 
 
46 WdL I, p. 123; p. 136. 
47 Koch does not develop the same structural comparative analysis I have tried 
to outline by referring to the liar paradox and to the structure of  the finite, but 
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Hegel and Priest share also the same idea about the solution 
of the paradoxical dynamic of the self-reference negation and of 
the contradiction it implies. In fact, whereas according to Priest 
the only solution to the paradoxes is to accept them as sound 
arguments, according to Hegel the contradiction which arises 
from a self-referential negativity, such as the one characterizing 
the structure of the finite, needs to be recognized as its own 
intrinsic and constitutive nature: 
 
Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds 
fast contradiction, and in it, its own self, but does not allow 
itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where its 
determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other 
determinations or into nothing48. 
 
We don’t necessarily have to reject contradictions, because 
this would mean to be dominated by them. Rather, we need to 
learn to acknowledge their truth and learn to understand them. 
This Hegelian approach is exactly the same as Priest, when he 
tries to show that we need to learn to live in a world that contains 
true contradictions49. 
 
he implicitly recognizes its validity, when he writes: «Davon handelt die Logik 
der Endlichkeit. Als Endliches nämlich erweist sich das Etwas als das, was es ist: 
seiner eigenen Negation äquivalent, und als selbstzerstörerisch in einem 
unendlichen Progress des Verneinens» (A.F. KOCH, Die Selbstbeziung der Negation 
in Hegels Logik, p. 17). In another article he is even more explicit about that: 
«den Ursachverhalt Etwas mit seiner immanenten Grenze oder Endliches, der sich 
sodann als mit seiner Negation äquivalent erweist: e ↔ ¬e. Oder das Endliche 
in seinem Widerspruch geht über in sein Gegenteil, das wiederum das 
Endliche ist usf., in einem infiniten Progress der Selbstzerstörung, einem 
paradoxen unvergänglichen Vergehen. Die beiden getrennte Momente des 
Umschlagens ins Affirmative und des ständigen Aussersichkommens sind hier 
eben vereinigt, und gerade indem das Endliche in selbstbezüglicher Negativität 
wiederum in Endliches umschlät, kommt es fortlaufend ausser sich» (A.F. 
KOCH, Dasein und Fürsichsein, p. 40). 
48 WdL II, p. 287; pp. 440-441. 
49 It is not by accident that Koch outlines a solution of the liar paradox that 
exactly mirrors Priest’s one – accepting the paradox as true – and that he 
describes as the solution that Hegel would have given: «Haben wir ja die 
Möglichkeit […] den Lügner als sinnvollen Satz zu akzeptieren: Auch wenn die 
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My aim is not to formalize the structure of the finite in 
Hegel’s logic, but to show how its self-contradictory structure is 
grounded on self-negating dynamic as well as the self-
contradiction entailed by the liar paradox . Priest himself writes:  
 
For no one before this century tried harder than Hegel to think 
through the consequences of thought thinking about itself, or 
the categories applying to itself. And this is just the kind of self-
referential situation that gives rise to the logical paradoxes50. 
 
Therefore, Hegel, as well as Priest, claims that there are true 
contradictions. Moreover, both Hegel and Priest reject trivialism, 
that is, the thesis that every contradiction is true (this implies that 
every sentence and the negation of every sentence are at the same 
time true and false, which means the complete loss of 
information). 
In the Doctrine of Essence Hegel claims that «everything is 
inherently contradictory»51. This sentence could be misunderstood as 
intending to affirm the trivialistic thesis. Actually, the con-
tradictoriness of everything does not imply that every contra-
diction is true, but that everything there is, namely everything that 
is determinate, is characterized by a contradictory nature. This 
does not mean that ‘anything goes’ and that it is possible to 
affirm the truth of absurd sentences such as «Socrates is a 
trireme». What Hegel’s thesis states is the contradictory nature of 
determinateness.  
In the same way, dialetheism is not the thesis that all 
contradictions are true, but that only some contradictions are true. 
More precisely, some aspects of reality and language involve 
contradictory structures. These contradictory structures represent 
constitutive features of these local aspects of reality.  
 
Negation uns in Antinomien verstrickt, so lassen wir sie uns (und unserem 
Denken) nicht nehmen; wir müssen den Widerspruch beherrschen lernen, ihn 
zähmen, ihn nützliche theoretische Arbeit leisten lassen. Dazu würde uns 
Hegel raten» (A.F. KOCH, Die Selbstbeziehung der Negation in Hegels Logik, p. 8). 
50 G. PRIEST, Dialectic and Dialetheic, «Science and Society», LIII (4), 1989, p. 
388.  
51 WdL II, p. 286; p. 439. 
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Both in Hegel and Priest, the aspects of linguistic or 
ontological reality involving true contradiction concern some 
kind of dynamism. This is explicitly acknowledged by Priest. In 
the article Dialectic and Dialetheic, that is focused on the intrinsic 
parallelisms between dialetheism and Hegel’s and Marx’ dialectic, 
he claims: 
 
The law of non-contradiction holds in formal logic; but formal 
logic is correctly applicable only to a limited area (notably the 
static and changeless); in dialectical logic, which applies in a 
much more general domain, the law of non-contradiction fails52. 
 
Therefore, Hegel and Priest share a fundamental perspective 
concerning the role true contradictions play in their conception 
of logic, because both conceive of contradiction as what allows 
logic to make room for aspects of thought and reality that 
standard logic cannot grasp, first of all dynamism. 
Nevertheless, I think a strictly dialetheistic account of the 
Hegelian concept of contradiction is wrong for some essential 
reasons. First of all, there are some obvious distinctions between 
Hegel’s and Priest’s approach to contradiction. The formalizing 
intent of Priest’s approach is completely absent in Hegel’s logic. 
Secondly, whereas in Hegel’s logic true contradictions are claimed 
to be necessary and justified by the development of the dialectical 
process, in dialetheism it is not so. In dialetheism, contradictions 
are isolated cases of a system that is mostly consistent, and 
Priest’s aim is to build a logical system able to prevent any kind of 
explosive consequence for the system itself. On the contrary, 
contradiction in Hegel’s logic is the logical-ontological structure 
of all the determinations of the system. Contradiction can be said 
to play a systematic role in Hegel’s logic. Facing Priest’s famous 
question ‘what is so bad about contradiction?’, Hegel’s would not 
have replied as Priest does: ‘maybe nothing much’, but ‘absolutely 
nothing’, because contradiction is the principle of determination 
of the logical categories. 
In order to test the equation of dialectic and dialetheism, I 
need to do the same I did with Brandom and to say something 
 
52 G. PRIEST, Dialectic and Dialetheic, p. 391. 
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more about Priest’s conception of the negation at the basis of 
true contradiction, which he calls dialetheias. A dialetheia is «any 
true statement of the form: α and it is not the case that α»53. Priest 
works with a negation whose semantic is the same as that of a 
standard one. Therefore if α is true then ¬α is false. This is why 
dialetheias, namely the claims of the truth of  ‘α Λ ¬α’, implies the 
conjuncts being both true and false, which is the third truth value 
he uses in order to explain the possibility for a contradiction to be 
true. 
According to Hegel, contradiction as the principle of 
determination is not both true and false. It is simply and radically 
true, because it is the speculative structure of logical-ontological 
determinations. This basically depends on Hegel’s notion of 
determinate negation and on his conception of logic.  
Determinate negation is different from standard negation, 
even if it is still a negation insofar as it still has an exclusive 
character. The negation of a determination is not equivalent to its 
falsity. This is why Hegel does not need any third truth-value in 
order to explain how a contradiction can be true. In its intrinsic 
dialectic that is its own self-negation and its own self-
contradiction, the determination is simply and concretely its own 
truth, it is what it necessarily needs to be according to its intrinsic 
essence. Hegel’s conception of logic and the contradictions it 
involves does not primarily deal with statements and their 
relations to reality, but with reality itself in its intrinsic dynamism. 
Hegel’s thesis contradictio regula veri means that contradiction is the 
law of truth, where truth needs to be meant as the intrinsic and 
essential structure of reality itself. 
Nevertheless, despite these incompatibilities between Hegel 
and Priest, the reference to dialetheism proves that coherence is 
not a necessary condition in order to come back to Hegel from a 
contemporary perspective. Only if we accept the challenge to 
think the truth of contradiction, as Priest does, will we walk the 
same path Hegel did, but if we avoid contradiction, as Brandom 
does, will we totally miss this path and the new destinations it can 
lead to. 
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